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Duty to the Target: Is an Attorney's Duty
to the Corporation a Paradigm
for Directors?
by
ROBERTA S. KARMEL*
An attorney representing a corporation represents the entity itself,
as governed by its authorized constituents. Although the corporation
may act through individual agents, the attorney does not thereby become
the lawyer for corporate officers, directors, or stockholders, either indi-
vidually or as a separate group within the corporate entity.1
Controversy over the role of counsel in corporate governance sur-
rounded the drafting and adoption of the American Bar Association's
(ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules). 2 The con-
troversy focused primarily on whether an attorney has any obligation to
disclose illegal management conduct and, if so, to whom.3 The response
to these queries depended upon whether an attorney's duty was to the
corporate entity, as proposed by the Model Rules drafters, or to the mar-
ketplace, as urged by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
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1. G. HAZARD, JR. & W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 231 (1985) [hereinafter G. HAZARD, JR. & W.
HODES, HANDBOOK].
2. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) (amended 1987) [hereinafter
MODEL RULES].
3. See, e-g., Block & Barton, Securities Litigation, 8 SEC. REG. L.J. 333, 335-36 (1981);
Lome, The Corporate and Securities Adviser, The Public Interest, and Professional Ethics, 76
MICH. L. REV. 425, 434-45 (1978); see also Exchange Act Release No. 16,045, Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 82,144 (July 25, 1979); Exchange Act Release No. 16,769, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) V 82,501 (Apr. 30, 1980).
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Although the Model Rules adopted the entity theory,4 the issue has re-
surfaced in the context of defending a target corporation against a hostile
takeover.5
Assuming the entity-client theory retains its prominence, the ques-
tion arises whether, in a takeover, a corporate attorney may counsel pres-
ervation of the corporation rather than work to cash out shareholders at
a premium price. Some courts have suggested that an attorney may have
a duty to shareholders in such a situation.6 Part I of this Article sug-
gests, to the contrary, that the entity theory permits counselling the sur-
vival of the corporate entity while overlooking shareholder interests.
The role of corporate counsel has not been alone in the debate; the
proper role of directors confronted with a hostile takeover has also been
under intense scrutiny in recent years. Although directors, like attor-
neys, owe a duty to the corporation, a corporate director's primary duty
is to the shareholders as a body, rather than to the corporate entity.7
Nevertheless, while a target company board cannot prefer itself or man-
agement over shareholders, 8 constituencies beyond the shareholders may
be considered. 9
No one, it seems, owes a duty to the combined future enterprise in a
merger or takeover. There has been no suggestion that the board of the
target corporation owes a duty to the shareholders of the acquiror, or
that the board of an acquiring corporation owes a duty to the sharehold-
ers of the target. Part II of this Article suggests that, under the entity-
client theory, a duty to the continuing business enterprise by a corporate
director can be extrapolated from an attorney's duty to the corporation
in the takeover situation.
I. Duty of an Attorney
A. The Entity Theory
Despite intense debate over changes in phraseology, modern legal
ethics fairly consistently have taught that the corporate entity is the cor-
4. MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.13. The entity theory is also endorsed as an
aspirational guideline in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-18 (1980) [hereinafter MODEL CODE].
5. See In re Allied Stores Corp., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,142 (June 29,
1987).
6. See infra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 67-77 and accompanying text.
8. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del.
1986).
9. Some states have legislated a duty to consider more complex interests. See infra notes
94-97 and accompanying text.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39
March 1988] ATTORNEYS' DUTY TO TARGET CORPORATION 679
porate lawyer's client. The ABA's first mention of a corporate lawyer's
ethical responsibility to his client occurs in the preliminary draft of the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Code)10 . Ethical Considera-
tion (EC) 6-17 of that draft contains a short statement consonant with
the traditional view that the client of a lawyer employed by an entity is
the entity itself and not "a stockholder, director, officer, employee or rep-
resentative thereof."11 Most of the language of EC 6-17 was incorpo-
rated into the final draft of the Code in EC 5-18.12 This adoption made it
clear that the concept of the entity client was specifically applicable to
corporations.
In 1977, less than ten years after the Code was passed, the ABA was
convinced the Code was inadequate and formed a commission (Kutak
Commission) to draft a new code. The Kutak Commission released a
discussion draft of its proposed model rules in 1980.13
The discussion draft, in Model Rule 1.13, reworded the entity-client
theory embodied in EC 5-18 of the Code14 and provided a detailed sched-
ule as to how a corporate attorney should proceed in the face of intra-
corporate conflict or management wrongdoing. 15 These proposed "whis-
tle-blowing" provisions were not well-received by the legal community.
Lawyers perceived these new rules as a departure from the ABA's philos-
ophy of self-regulation in ethical matters, requiring corporate lawyers to
place the interests of the public before those of the corporation itself.16
10. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 6-17 (Preliminary Draft
1969).
11. Id.. Ethical Consideration 6-17 does allow an attorney to serve the individual if he or
she is convinced that no conflict of interest exists.
12. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-18 (1969). The Code has
been adopted, with modifications, in all states except California. See Note, Disqualification of
Corporate Counsel in Derivative Actions: Jacuzzi and the Inadequacy of Dual Representation, 31
HASTINGS L.J. 347, 348 (1979).
13. Kutak, Coming: The New Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 66 A.B.A. J. 46
(1980).
14. MODEL CODE, supra note 4, EC 5-18. Model lule 1.13 provided: "A lawyer em-
ployed or retained to represent an organization represents the organization as distinct from its
directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents." MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (Discussion Draft 1980).
15. See id. Recommended actions include (1) seeking reconsideration of the matter, (2)
referring the matter to a higher authority in the organization, (3) revealing information relat-
ing to the representation of the organization, and (4) other remedial action that the lawyer
reasonably believes to be in the best interest of the organization.
16. See G. Hazard, Jr. & L. Silverman, Will the ABA Draft Model Rules of Professional
Conduct Change The Concept of the Lawyers Role?, The Third Orison S. Marden Memorial
Lecture, Association of the Bar of the City of New York 22-25 (Dec. 9, 1986); Winter, Muting
the Whistle, 69 A.B.A. J. 421, 422 (1983). Perhaps this reaction to the Kutak Commission's
proposals was overblown. See G. HAZARD, JR. & W. HODES, HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at
Despite this criticism, rule 1.13 substantially retained the language
from DR 5-110 of the draft: 17 "A lawyer employed or retained by an
organization represents the organization acting through its duly author-
ized constituents." Beyond identifying who the corporate lawyer repre-
sents, rule 1.13 addresses the dilemma of the corporate lawyer who has
gained knowledge of proposed or actual illegal acts of certain corporate
officers or employees. Unfortunately, the Rule does not deal directly
with the more difficult question of how the corporate lawyer should pro-
ceed when conflicts of interest arise among various constituents of the
corporation.
Contrary to the opinion of those who feared that the Model Rules
would alienate the corporate lawyer from the corporate structure by
making the role of counsel that of policeman, the language of the Model
Rules actually supports the view that a corporation's lawyer should not
interfere with the directions issued from the top of the corporate hierar-
chy unless the directors themselves are taking an illegal course of action.
Rule 1.13 assumes that, barring any question of illegality, the corporate
lawyer fulfills his duties by competently advising the corporation's man-
agement or officers.' 8 In practical terms, this means that a corporate
239-40; Kutak, Whom Does The Corporate Counsel Represent?, 1 CORP. DIRECTOR 1, 3
(1981).
17. As adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in August 1982, the final draft of rule
1.13 (a) provided: "A lawyer employed or retained to represent an organization represents the
organization as distinct from its directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other
constituents." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (Final Draft 1982).
Because of amendments proposed by the American College of Trial Lawyers at the 1983 mid-
year ABA meeting, an exception was added onto this rule as follows: "except where the inter-
ests of any one or more of the group may be adverse to the organization's interest." Winter,
supra note 16, at 422. This amendment was eliminated in the version of rule 1.13(a) that was
finally adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in August 1983, which provides: "A lawyer
employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duty
authorized constituents." MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.13.
To date, the Model Rules have been adopted in 24 states. See ABA/BNA LAWYER'S
MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 01:3 (1987). In 1985, the New York state bar rejected
a proposed version of the Model Rules. The Model Rules have not yet been considered in
California.
18. The official comment to Model Rule 1.13 states:
When constituents of the organization make decisions for it, the decisions ordinarily
must be accepted by the lawyer even if their utility or prudence is doubtful. Deci-
sions concerning policy and operations including ones entailing serious risk, are not
as such in the lawyer's province. However, different considerations arise when the
lawyer knows that the organization may be substantially injured by action of constit-
uent [sic] that is in violation of law.
MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.13 comment; see Forrow, The Corporate Law Department
Lawyer: Counsel to the Entity, 34 Bus. LAW 1797, 1799 (1979); Kutak, Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct: Ethical Standards for the '80's and Beyond, 67 A.B.A. J. 1116, 1118 (1981).
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lawyer has a duty to follow the directions given by the corporation's of-
ficers unless he knows that such directions are both illegal and will sub-
stantially injure the corporation.
Although the entity-client theory has been embraced by the ABA in
Model Rule 1.13 and by the courts in general, its acceptance has not been
unanimous. The ABA, the courts, and legal commentators all have ex-
pressed their dissatisfaction with the entity-client fiction.
On behalf of the ABA, the Kutak Commission itself contemplated,
but rejected, a group theory of representation in which the corporate law-
yer represent several distinct clients-the shareholders, the directors, the
employees-rather than a juridical whole. 19 This formula was consid-
ered untenable, however, because it would have required a corporation's
lawyer to abandon his service to the corporation if a conflict of interest
arose among the several groups.20
Several courts have expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of gui-
dance the entity-client theory offers in the face of conflicts among several
constituent groups that make up the fictional corporate entity.21 These
courts have offered alternatives, including analogizing counsel's duty to
the duty of a corporate director and articulating a direct duty to share-
holders. 22 The courts generally acknowledge, however, that the entity-
client theory is controlling.23
Legal commentators have likewise expressed their dissatisfaction
with the entity-client fiction and have offered several alternative analy-
ses.24 One commentator, Scott Fitzgibbon, has suggested that there are
19. G. HAZARD, JR. & W. HODES, HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 232-33.
20. Id. at 233.
21. See, e.g., Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974
(1970); Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins., 282 N.W.2d 639 (Iowa 1979).
22. See infra notes 53-66 and accompanying text.
23. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'ns, 320 F.2d 314, 318-19 (7th Cir.
1963); A.B. Pick Co. v. Man, 95 F. Supp. 83, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Rowen v. Le Mars Mut.
Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639, 651 (Iowa 1979).
24. Among the several alternative theories, commentators have argued for a "counsel to
the situation" or "group" theory approach. See Shipman, The Need for, SEC Rulemaking
Concerning the Duties and Civil Liabilities of Attorneys, 30 Bus. LAW. 34, 35-36 (1975); see
also Weddington, A Fresh Approach to Preserving Independent Judgment-Canon 6 of the Pro-
posed Code of Professional Responsibility, 11 ARIZ. L. REV. 31, 35-36, 52 (1969) (proposing a
balancing approach). Arguing for a similar approach in certain specified circumstances, see
Probert & Hendricks, Lawyer Malpractice: Duty Relationships Beyond Contract, 55 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 708, 724-25 (1980) (partnership organization) and Paul, A New Role for Lawyers
in Contract Negotiations, 62 A.B.A. J. 93 (1976). But cf G. HAZARD, JR. & W. HODES,
HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 232-33 (group theory rejected as unworkable in the case of intra-
corporate conflict). Another alternative is a joint-client approach. See S. FITZGIBBON, PRO-
FESSIONAL ETHICS, ORGANIZING CORPORATIONS, AND THE IDEOLOGY OF CORPORATE AR-
TICLES AND BY-LAWS 7-8 (1982).
four situations in which the entity-client fiction breaks down: corporate
deadlocks, battles for corporate control, disputes about the propriety of
management's behavior in office, and, arguably, situations in which the
corporation is the alter ego of an individual.25
As authority for the assertion that the entity-client theory appears
not to apply to corporate deadlock or battles for corporate control, Fitz-
gibbon relies on a 1932 ABA Informal Opinion 26 and Yablonski v. United
Mine Workers of America.27 The ABA Informal Opinion, however, if
read in its entirety, actually is an early articulation of the entity-client
theory that holds that a corporation's general counsel must refrain from
taking sides in an internal struggle for corporate control precisely be-
cause the corporate counsel represents the entity and not a specific con-
stituent group thereof.28 And Yablonski fits better under Fitzgibbon's
third category--disputes about the propriety of management's behavior
in office. 29 While there is some authority for this exception, the trend is
toward a conflict-of-interest analysis that is more consistent with the en-
tity-client concept.30
25. S. FITZGIBBON, supra note 24, at 2, 9. The last situation, in which an attorney for a
close corporation owes a duty to individual shareholders, is both rare and problematic. See
Egan v. McNamara, 467 A.2d 733 (D.C. App. 1983); see also C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL
ETHICS § 8.3.2 (1986) (principle that the loyalty of a corporate lawyer must be directed solely
toward the interests of the entity is somewhat more ambigious regarding conflicts issues for
small, closely held corporations than for large corporate clients).
26. S. FITZGIBBON, supra note 24, at 9 n.27 (citing ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics
and Grievances, Informal Op. 86 (1932)).
27. 448 F.2d 1175, enforced per curiam, 454 F.2d 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 906 (1972).
28. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Informal Op. 86 (1932). This
opinion has, in any event, been superseded. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Informal Op. 1056 (1968) (attorney for a corporation may advise the corporate
president of a method of electing directors, provided he sincerely believes his advice to be
legally sound and supportable and not contrary to the interests of the corporation itself).
29. Yablonski involved a § 501 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act suit
brought by United Mine Workers of America members against the union and its individual
officers asking for an accounting and restitution of funds allegedly misappropriated and mis-
spent by union officers. 448 F.2d at 1176-77. At issue in the case was whether it was proper
for regular outside counsel to the union to represent both the union and the individual officers.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that independent outside counsel
had to be retained for both the union and its officers. Id.
30. For two good overviews of the problem and the trend towards requiring corporations
to retain independent counsel in shareholders' derivative suits alleging misconduct by corpo-
rate officers where the counsel has defended the officers previously in related litigation, see
Note, supra note 12, and Note, Independent Representation for Corporate Defendants in Deriv-
ative Suit, 74 YALE L.J. 524 (1965). See also Annotation, Propriety of Attorney Who Has
Represented Corporation Acting For Corporation in Controversy With Officer, Director, or
Stockholder, I A.L.R. 4TH 1124 (1985) (discusses state and federal cases dealing with propri-
ety of counsel's conduct).
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B. Duty to the Marketplace
The SEC position that attorneys owe a duty to investors or the mar-
ketplace that transcends their duty to the corporation contributed to the
controversy surrounding Model Rule 1.13. This SEC theory first sur-
faced in the Commission's complaint in SEC v. National Student Market-
ing, 31 in which the SEC named lawyers from two prominent law firms as
defendants. The SEC argued a novel theory of corporate counsel's obliga-
tions: If corporate counsel received last minute information indicating
certain financial statements could be inaccurate, after a shareholder vote
and just prior to management's signing of a merger agreement, counsel
had a duty, in absence of management action, to disclose this information
to company shareholders or to the SEC. The agency asserted counsel
aided and abetted management's securities law violations by failing to
meet this duty of disclosure.
The complaint and the SEC theory caused a storm of controversy. 32
In effect, the SEC argued that a lawyer has an obligation to go beyond
advice to a client (in this instance to proceed with the merger) and to
make public disclosure of information if the client fails to take the appro-
priate action. Subsequent settlements in the case and a confusing district
court opinion left the SEC theory hanging, neither accepted nor rejected
by the courts.
The securities bar strenuously objected to SEC efforts to impose a
duty to the marketplace on lawyers. While National Student Marketing
was pending, the ABA adopted a policy recommendation of the securi-
ties bar Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law. The recom-
mendation rejected the principle that a lawyer is permitted or obliged to
disclose to the SEC otherwise confidential information, because such dis-
closure would be contrary to the "confidentiality of lawyer-client consul-
tations and advice and the fiduciary loyalty of the lawyer to the client" as
prescribed by the Code. 33 In other words, while a lawyer has a duty to
31. 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
32. See, e.g., Karmel, Attorney's Securities Laws Liabilities, 27 Bus. LAW. 1153 (1972);
Koch, Attorney's Liability: The Securities Bar and the Impact of National Student Marketing,
14 WM. & MARY L. REv. 883 (1973); Lipman, The SEC'S Reluctant Police Force: A New Role
for Lawyers, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 437 (1974); Patterson, The Limits of the Lawyer's Discretion
and the Law of Legal Ethics: National Student Marketing Revisited, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1251.
33. Statement of Policy Adopted by American Bar Association Regarding Responsibilities
and Liabilities of Lawyers in Advising with Respect to the Compliance by Clients with Laws
Administered By The Securities and Exchange Commission, reprinted in 31 Bus. LAW. 543
(1975). In February, 1974 the ABA added a proviso to DR 7-102(B) of the Code, which under
some circumstances obligates a lawyer whose client has perpetrated a fraud on a person or
tribunal to reveal the fraud. The proviso excepted information protected as a privileged com-
munication. MODEL CODE, supra note 4, DR 7-102(B).
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advise a corporation to comply with SEC disclosure requirements, the
Code prohibits the lawyer from assuring that compliance by undermin-
ing the juridical entity and making disclosures directly to the SEC.
The SEC, however, continued to argue for a greater role for lawyers
in corporate governance whereby an attorney for a corporation would
become an independent promoter of the public interest. At the 1980
ABA convention, SEC chairman Harold Williams voiced the Commis-
sion's position, criticizing the proposed Model Rules as not going "far
enough along the road in confirming the corporate lawyer's role and re-
sponsibility" as an independent professional. 34 The Commission's efforts
were largely ineffective.
While the Model Rules were being debated, the SEC published for
comment a proposed rule drafted by the Institute for Public Representa-
tion, a public-interest academic group. The rule would have required
companies to certify to shareholders each year that all employed or re-
tained attorneys were instructed to report to the board of directors any
corporate activities that "violate or probably violate any law."' 35 In addi-
tion, the rule would have required companies to disclose to shareholders
written agreements between a corporation and its outside attorney that
specified, among other things, the frequency and nature of the counsel's
contacts with the board and his obligations regarding any illegal conduct
he might discover. 36
The SEC further explicated its views on the ethical responsibilities
of corporate counsel in an administrative proceeding pursuant to SEC
rule 2(e),37 In re Carter & Johnson.38 This proceeding involved the lia-
34. Address by Harold M. Williams, Professionalism and the Corporate Bar, Section of
Corporation, Banking and Business Law, Honolulu (Aug. 5, 1980), reprinted in 36 Bus. LAW.
159, 167 (Nov. 1980).
35. Exchange Act Release No. 16,045, Fed Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,144 (July 25, 1979).
The SEC declined to take this action after receiving public comment. Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 16,769, Fed Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82, 501 (Apr. 30, 1980).
36. Id.
37. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1970). Rule 2(e) provides that the SEC may discipline and
sanction any person, by means of a suspension or permanent bar from practice before the
agency, who is found:
(i) Not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others, or (ii) to be lacking
in character or integrity or to have engaged in unethical or improper professional
conduct, or (iii) to have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the violation
of any provision of the federal securities laws, or the rules and regulations
thereunder.
A discussion of the SEC's authority to promulgate rule 2(e) and the wisdom of its policy in
prosecuting lawyers is beyond the scope of this Article. The author's objections to the Com-
mission's use of rule 2(e) to discipline attorneys are long standing and can be very briefly
summarized. First, as a matter of statutory construction, the Commission's authority to pro-
mulgate rule 2(e) is questionable. That is, the general power to "make such rules and regula-
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bility of attorneys under the securities laws for the failure of a financially
pressed client to make adequate disclosure about its deteriorating finan-
cial condition. The SEC held that it had jurisdictional authority to sanc-
tion an attorney under rule 2(e) for either aiding and abetting a securities
law violation by a client or for unethical or improper professional con-
duct.39 The proceeding established that drafting SEC disclosure docu-
ments was "substantial assistance" in a client's fraud that justified the
imposition of a sanction if the attorney had the requisite improper in-
tent.40 The SEC also expressed the view that it could sanction a lawyer
for unprofessional conduct if the lawyer was significantly responsible for
a company's compliance with SEC disclosure requirements, became
aware that the client is engaged in a continuing failure to satisfy those
requirements, and did not take prompt steps to end the client's noncom-
pliance.41 Although the Carter & Johnson opinion does not explicitly re-
ject the entity-client theory of the Code or Model Rules, it elevates a duty
to the marketplace over any duty to keep the corporation afloat.
The SEC view that an attorney owes a duty to the marketplace was
embraced by a statute proposed (but never enacted) in 1983.42 The stat-
ute would have amended the mail fraud statute to make criminal a law-
yer's failure to make timely disclosure to federal law enforcement
authorities of knowledge of a client's misconduct if he learned either that
his client intended to commit or with his services has committed a crimi-
nal or fraudulent act.
Much of the debate over the SEC views on professional responsibil-
ity and the adoption of the Model Rules focused on a perceived effort to
abrogate an attorney's duty to maintain client confidences. In the final
analysis, however, the entity theory is the center of the dispute. The SEC
tions as may be necessary or appropriate to implement" the provisions of the securities laws is
not a sufficient predicate for a program to discipline professionals, particularly attorneys. Sec-
ond, the SEC's utilization of rule 2(e) to promote the agency's regulatory policies is an unwar-
ranted interference with the right to the effective assistance of counsel of persons regulated by
the Commission. When the author was a Commissioner of the SEC, she articulated these
views in a dissent in In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Exchange Act Release No. 15,982,
17 SEC Docket 1149, 1157-63 (July 2, 1979). See also Daley & Karmel, Attorneys'Responsi-
bilities: Adversaries at the Bar of the SEC, 24 EMORY L.J. 747, 762-65 (1975). This question-
ing of the SEC's authority over attorneys has continued. See Address by Edward H.
Fleischman, Aligning the Compass for the SEC's Relationship with its Practicing Bar, Annual
Ray Garrett, Jr. Corporate and Securities Law Institute, Chicago, Ill. (Apr. 30, 1987).
38. Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
82,847 ( Feb. 28, 1981).
39. Id. at 84,165-69.
40. Id. at 84,166.
41. Id. at 84,172-73.
42. Lawyers Duty of Disclosure Act of 1983, S. 485, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
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assumes that a lawyer who assists in the preparation of disclosure docu-
ments represents investors and owes a duty to the marketplace. This
doctrine is troublesome enough in the context of management wrongdo-
ing or illegality. It is even more troublesome in the context of represent-
ing a target company in a hostile takeover because there may be a conflict
between the interests of different constituencies within the corporate en-
tity and a further conflict between the target and non-shareholder
investors.
After a number of years of relative quiescence in the prosecution of
attorneys by the SEC,43 the Commission has revived its enforcement pro-
gram against corporate counsel by bringing an administrative proceeding
against George C. Kern, Jr.44 The SEC charged Kern, the head of merg-
ers and acquisitions at a major New York City law firm, with violating
the federal securities laws based on his failure to advise Allied Stores
Corp. (Allied) to amend a Williams Act 45 filing in response to a tender
offer to disclose merger negotiations with a white knight. Although
Kern was a director of Allied, the SEC's case seems to be based on his
activities as a lawyer. Furthermore, the materiality of the disclosure in-
volved is not clear-cut. 46
Among the many troublesome issues raised by this prosecution is
the disparity between the duty to the corporate entity set forth in the
Code and the Model Rules and the duty to the marketplace asserted by
the SEC. Whether Allied's strategy in dealing with a white knight and
maintaining silence about these negotiations was in the corporate entity's
best interest was probably a difficult legal judgment. Even if the SEC is
correct in its view that these negotiations should have been disclosed, an
attorney can be held liable only for a breach of professional ethics on a
theory that he owed a duty to investors. 47 This may explain why the
SEC did not bring this case under rule 2(e) charging improper profes-
43. At the beginning of 1982 the SEC General Counsel announced a self-imposed limita-
tion on rule 2(e) cases to situations in which there was a violation of state law professional
ethics or in which there was a direct impact on the SEC's internal processes. Remarks of
Edward F. Greene, SEC Disciplinary Proceedings Against Lawyers Reviewed, Jan. 13, 1982,
reprinted in N.Y.L.J. 15 (Jan. 2, 1982). For the next five years no significant cases under rule
2(e) were brought against an attorney.
44. In re Allied Stores Corp., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) C 84,142, (June 29,
1987).
45. Securities Exchange Act § 14(d)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(4) (1934).
46. See Block & Hoff, SEC Kern Proceeding Is Ill-Advised Decision, N.Y.L.J. 5, 6 (July
16, 1987).
47. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9 (1984), promulgated under the Williams Act, requires a sub-
ject company to describe any transaction, board resolution, agreement in principle, or signed
contract in response to a tender offer that relates to or would result in, among other things, an
extraordinary transaction such as a merger, a purchase, sale or transfer of a material amount
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sional conduct, but rather charged Kern with being a "cause" of Allied's
violation.
C. Resolving Conflicts
The entity theory of rule 1.13 suggests that an attorney for the target
corporation does not owe a direct duty to shareholders, but to the target
corporation itself. It could thus be argued that the entity theory would
permit the lawyer to work for the preservation of the corporation as a
viable business entity and need not be concerned about whether share-
holders are cashed out at a premium price.
Although there is no case law directly on point to guide a corporate
attorney facing a hostile takeover situation, there is some authority to
indicate that a corporation's attorney may reasonably aid the corpora-
tion's officers to retain power but only if such aid is in the corporation's
best interest.48 Other cases, primarily shareholder's derivative suits alleg-
ing fraudulent and illegal acts on the part of the corporation's officers,
indicate that shareholder's interests are of paramount importance. 49
These cases are not necessarily determinative in analyzing or resolving
the conflicts in hostile takeover situations. The conflicts between corpo-
rate constituents of a target are more complicated than in a derivative
action and may shift as events unfold. Furthermore, it may not be clear
whether management is acting illegally in seeking to retain control.
In general, the law seems to countenance the perpetuation of the
corporate entity and therefore permits a corporate attorney to defend the
corporation against outsiders. Nevertheless, the law sometimes imposes
on counsel a duty to shareholders when the shareholders have grounds to
challenge the legality of the actions of other constituents, generally of-
ficers or inside directors. The ABA, adhering closely to the entity-client
theory, has spelled out the ethical responsibilities of the corporate lawyer
in several opinions involving constituent conflicts.50 In a 1968 Informal
Opinion,51 the ABA stated that a corporation's lawyer might properly
advise incumbent officers how to defeat a bid for power by minority
of assets by the subject company, or a tender offer for or other acquisition of securities by the
subject company.
48. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1056
(1968); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 202 (1940); ABA
Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Informal Op. 86 (1932). For similar ABA
Informal Opinions, see ABA DIVISION OF EDUCATION, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A
GUIDE FOR ATTORNEYS 278-79 (1978).
51. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1056 (1968).
stockholders in a proxy battle, so long as the lawyer "sincerely believes
such advice to be legally sound and supportable and not contrary to the
interests of the corporation itself."'52
In that situation, a corporation's attorney, who was also a stock-
holder, advised the president of the corporation to call for separate elec-
tions on each nomination of a director in order to dilute the strength of
the minority shareholders' votes and frustrate their attempt to obtain
representation on the board of directors. While the ABA stressed the
entity-client theory of representation and concluded that such advice was
proper only if it was not contrary to the interest of the corporation itself,
the opinion also seemed to indicate that there might be an affirmative
duty to render such advice under the circumstances. The opinion indi-
cated that the lawyer's ethical duties would be similar in the event of a
tender offer from outsiders.
In Egan v. McNamara, 53 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held in part that the only obligation of corporate counsel who
drew up a buy-sell agreement for a close corporation was "to ensure that
the agreement was in the best interest of the company, regardless of its
impact on individual shareholders."' 54 The buy-sell agreement restricted
the transferability of stock and contained a provision whereby upon the
death of any stockholder the corporation was required to purchase all of
the deceased's shares. Upon the death of a major stockholder, Egan, a
coexecutor of his estate, brought suit against the surviving shareholders
and the corporation seeking to rescind or reform the buy-sell agreement
to require return of the deceased shareholder's stock.55 One of Egan's
theories for recovery was that the corporate attorney who executed the
buy-sell agreement and who was also an officer and shareholder of the
corporation owed a fiduciary duty to the deceased. The attorney alleg-
edly breached the fiduciary duty by putting the corporation's interest
before that of the deceased in developing the buy-sell agreement.
56
The court rejected the notion that corporate counsel stood in a fidu-
ciary relationship to any individual shareholder, even in a close corpora-
tion, and held that corporate counsel's duty was to place the
corporation's continued existence and safety from outside parties before
52. "To hold otherwise would deprive management of the advice of the lawyer most
familiar with the corporation's affairs, which in turn could result in exposing both manage-
ment and the corporation itself to disruption and damaging and expensive litigation which
could have been avoided." Id. at 3.
53. 467 A.2d 733 (D.C. App. 1983).
54. Id. at 739.
55. Id. at 737.
56. Id. at 738.
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the interests of any corporate constituent. 57 While Egan does not stand
for the proposition that a corporation's attorney may ignore stockholder
interests in an effort to defeat a hostile takeover, the Egan decision does
recognize that a corporate attorney may have a duty to protect the con-
tinued existence of the corporation and to keep it safe from outside par-
ties who may have an interest in taking over the company, despite the
impact on shareholders.
Other decisions, mostly shareholder's derivative suits focusing on
corporate counsel's duty to disclose communications made to corporate
officers, or knowledge of corporate officers' illegal acts, suggest that the
corporation's attorney owes an ultimate duty of loyalty to the corpora-
tion's shareholders. Because these cases equate the shareholders with the
corporate entity-client itself, they implicitly reject the entity-client
theory.
In Rowen v. Le Mars Mutual Insurance Co., 58 involving a breach of
fiduciary duty in the sale of control, the Supreme Court of Iowa found
that counsel to an insurance company owed a duty to the corporation
analogous to that of a corporate director: "[the attorney's] duty is to the
entire body of shareholders, or, in this case, policyholders. His obliga-
tion, indeed, is similar to, if not identical with, that of director. ' 59 Le
Mars policyholders brought a derivative action against Le Mars and an-
other insurance company that illegally purchased control of Le Mars by
paying off its directors to resign. Le Mars' counsel assisted in the sale
and was to become a corporate director of Le Mars as a result of the
transaction. The trial court did not address the liability to policyholders,
but found Le Mars' attorney liable for a breach of his fiduciary duty as
an incoming director of Le Mars.60 The supreme court, however, specifi-
cally found that the attorney was liable as Le Mars' attorney for breach-
ing his duty to the policyholders.6'
The leading case of Garner v. Wolftnbarger,62 involving the attorney-
client privilege, provides another example of a court's implicit rejection
of the entity-client theory. Garner held that communications between a
corporation's attorney and its officers were subject to discovery in a
shareholders' class action suit charging the corporation and its officers
with violations of state and federal securities law. The Fifth Circuit rec-
57. Id. at 739-40.
58. 282 N.W.2d 639 (Iowa 1979).
59. Id. at 654 (citation omitted).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 654-56.
62. 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1970).
ognized that the attorney-client privilege enjoyed by corporate clients
was not invalid merely because those demanding disclosure were stock-
holders of the corporation. Nevertheless, the court held that:
where the corporation is in suit against its stockholders on charges of
acting inimically to stockholder interests, protection of those interests
as well as those of the corporation and of the public require that the
availability of the privilege be subject to the right of the stockholders to
show cause why it should not be invoked in the particular instance.
63
Underlying this balancing of the interests of the corporation, the stock-
holders, and the public, however, is a rejection of the entity-client theory
in favor of a premise that the stockholders' interests override those of the
other constituents. 64
The Fifth Circuit also appeared to credit, though it did not adopt, a
joint client formulation of the corporate attorney's role.65 Under this
analysis the corporate attorney serves both the corporation and the
stockholders as joint clients. Neither the corporation nor the stockhold-
ers could then assert the attorney-client privilege against the other party.
Such a conception seems flawed in that it would doubly favor stockhold-
ers' interests both as one of the joint clients and as a constituent group
within the other.
National Student Marketing Corp. 66 also enforced a corporate attor-
ney's duty to inform shareholders of illegal acts by other corporate con-
stituents when the court found a substantial impairment of stockholder
interests. Yet disclosure would have prevented the consummation of a
merger that may have been in the corporate entity's best interests.
As the foregoing analysis suggests, the duty of an attorney when
confronted by conflicts among corporate constituencies is not entirely
clear. The fact that the counsel involved had a dual role, such as officer,
director, or shareholder, complicates the problem. When the attorney is
perceived as having compromised his independence by an alignment with
management, he is more likely to be held to have breached a duty to
shareholders. Obedience to management's lawful instructions, however,
is precisely the teaching of Model Rule 1.13.
Furthermore, SEC and judicial attempts to carve out exceptions
from the entity-client theory for situations involving unlawful manage-
ment or director behavior puts an attorney in a difficult situation. Gener-
63. Id. at 1103-04 (footnote omitted).
64. "Conceptualistic phrases describing the corporation as an entity separate from its
stockholders are not useful tools of analysis. They serve to obscure the fact that management
has duties which run to the benefit ultimately of the stockholders." Id. at 1101.
65. Id. at 1103.
66. 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
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ally, the very decision that imposes a duty to shareholders on the
attorney-long after the fact-is the same decision that finds manage-
ment conduct unlawful. This is because officers and directors normally
are the corporation's representatives and agents, and only egregious be-
havior calls into question their authority to act for the corporation and
instruct counsel. But the illegality of management's conduct under se-
curities laws or similar statutes may not seem so clear to counsel during
the course of a transaction as it does to a court later on.
II. Duty of Directors to the Target Corporation
Directors, like attorneys, may sometimes be caught in a cross-fire
between conflicting corporate constituencies when the question of which
constituency is primary arises. The directors also owe certain basic du-
ties to the corporation itself. These similarities between the dilemmas
facing corporate directors and corporate counsel suggest that the duty
owed to the corporation by attorneys may be a useful model for direc-
tors' duties.
A. Duties of Care and Loyalty
Directors owe a duty of care to their corporation. 67 This duty gener-
ally is expressed as that degree of skill, diligence, and care that an ordi-
nary prudent person would exercise in similar circumstances. 68 In
reaction to decisions imposing liability on directors for failure to exercise
due care in responding to change of control situations69 and to the direc-
tor and officer insurance liability crisis, 70 Delaware and numerous other
states passed legislation permitting corporations to limit or eliminate the
personal liability of directors for breach of the duty of care.71
67. A director must discharge his duties "in good faith" and "with the care an ordinarily
prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances." REVISED
MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 8.30 (1984). The prior version of this provision
(§ 35) has been adopted in 7 of 22 states that had duty of care statutes. Also, 28 states had
established a common-law duty of care. See ALI, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 12 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1984) [hereinafter Tent. Draft
No. 3).
68. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 8.30 (1984); see D. BLOCK, N.
BARTON & S. RADIN, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 24-30 (1987).
69. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
70. See Veasey, Finkelstein & Bigler, Responses to the D&O Insurance Crisis, 19 REV.
SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 263 (1986).
71. Shareholders can adopt a charter provision limiting or even eliminating the personal
liability of a director except for breach of the duty of loyalty or intentional misconduct. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(6) (1974). Many other states have followed this approach. See,
e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717(b) ch. 367 § l(b) (McKinney Supp. 1988). Other states have
simply lowered the duty of care. See Hazen, Corporate Directors' Accountability: The Race to
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Directors also owe a duty of loyalty to their corporation. 72 Some-
times this is expressed as a duty of fair dealing. 7 3 When directors have a
conflict of interest, they must demonstrate the fairness of a transaction in
which they were interested. 74
The burdens imposed upon directors by the duties of care and loy-
alty are threshold requirements that must be met before a court will ap-
ply the business judgment rule, which shields directors from liability for
disinterested business decisions made with due care, in good faith and
without an abuse of discretion. 75 In cases involving target company de-
fenses against hostile takeovers, the line between the duty of care and the
duty of loyalty has sometimes become blurred because courts have pre-
sumed that directors are interested in remaining in office. 76 In Delaware,
therefore, the business judgment rule applies to defensive mechanisms
against takeovers only if the directors have reasonable grounds to believe
that a danger to the corporation exists and the defensive mechanism is
"reasonable in relation to the threat posed. ' 77
B. Beneficiaries of Fiduciary Duties
The primary beneficiaries of the fiduciary duties owed to the corpo-
ration by directors are the shareholders, 78 because a basic objective of the
corporation is to enhance shareholder value.79 Directors also owe duties
to other groups, especially creditors.80 Numerous laws and regulatory
the Bottom-The Second Lap, 66 N.C.L. REV. 171 (1984); King, Director Protection Under
Virginia Law, 20 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 129, 129 (1987).
72. R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 141 (1986).
73. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983).
74. 3 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 931 (perm. ed. 1986); see, e.g.,
Drobin v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 631 F. Supp. 860, 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Sterling v.
Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 298, 93 A.2d 107, 110 (Del. 1952); Alpert v. 28
Williams St. Corp., 63 N.Y.2d 557, 570-71, 473 N.E.2d 19, 26-27 (1984); see also Tent. Draft
No. 3, supra note 67, at 107-41.
75. D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, supra note 68, at 24.
76. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (en-
hanced scrutiny demanded by "the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily
in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders").
77. Id.
78. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 240 Mich. 459, 500-02, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919); Berle,
Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931). Directors owe
their duty to the shareholders as a body, not as individual shareholders. See Goodwin v.
Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 660 (Mass. 1933); 3 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS
§ 848 (perm. ed. 1986).
79. See Schwartz, Defining the Corporate Objective: Section 2.01 of the ALI's Principles,
52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 511, 512, 528-29 (1984).
80. Pepper v. Litton 308 U.S. 295, 307-10 (1939) (holding directors cannot disregard
their fiduciary duty to outside creditors by subordinating the creditors' claims to their own
doubtful claims against the corporation); Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to its Cred-
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agencies require corporations and their directors to assume duties to em-
ployees,81 customers, 82 and society generally.83
In the day-to-day operation of a corporation, the duties that direc-
tors owe to various groups are not difficult to reconcile, although compli-
ance with legal obligations to non-shareholders may diminish
shareholder profits. Society and the courts concluded long ago that the
single-minded pursuit of corporate profits should be ameliorated by vol-
untary or statutory obligations to non-shareholder constituencies. 84
Nevertheless, when directors are confronted by a hostile takeover
their actual or felt obligations to non-shareholder groups may conflict
with their duty to shareholders. In part, this conflict results because the
very existence of the corporation is at stake. If the corporation is liqui-
dated or merely merged out of existence the shareholders may gain, but
various other constituencies, particularly employees, may lose the value
of their claims on corporate assets. As in a bankruptcy, the liquidation
value of the corporation may not be as great as the going concern value,
at least not to all of the constituencies that the corporation touches.
Although the courts have demonstrated some sympathy for the di-
lemma of directors caught in such a conflict of interest situation, the abil-
ity of directors to prefer non-shareholder constituencies to shareholders
is extremely limited. Furthermore, it is clear that directors cannot put
their own interests ahead of shareholder interests. When a corporation
becomes insolvent, the duty of directors to creditors is elevated. 85 Per-
haps a takeover should work a similar rearrangement of director
allegiance.
These principles are well demonstrated by Revlon, Inc. v MacAn-
itors, 90 HARv. L. REV. 505, 510-11 (1977). The majority rule is that the duty of directors to
creditors of a solvent corporation is not a fiduciary duty, but a contractual duty. See Simmons
v. Cogan, No. 8890 (Del. Ch. Dec. 2, 1987) (WESTLAW, State database, Del.).
81. See, e.g., Occupational Safety & Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982); Employee
Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C § 1004(a)(1) (1982).
82. See, e.g., Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1982); see also United
States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 667-69 (1975) (president of national good chain convicted for
violating Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act).
83. See, eg., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1948); Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (1955); Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-
2629(1976). Juggling the interests of competing corporate constituencies is difficult enough.
Instructing directors to take society's interests into account would only further matters. Lip-
ton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 42, 43
(1987).
84. A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 153-54, 98 A.2d 581, 586 (1953).
85. Automatic Canteen Co. v. Wharton, 358 F.2d 587, 590 (2d Cir. 1966); New York
Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Weiss, 110 N.E.2d 397, 398 (N.Y. 1953).
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drews & Forbes Holdings,86 in which the court enjoined Revlon, Inc.
(Revlon) from consummating an option granted to a "white knight" to
purchase certain Revlon assets (lock up) and to deal exclusively with the
white knight (no shop). In order to protect shareholders against a hostile
takeover at an inadequate price, the Revlon board had enacted a rights
plan and then made a self tender in exchange for notes and preferred
stock. The bidder then raised its bid significantly. Revlon then negoti-
ated with the white knight and made a merger contract, which provided
protection for the noteholders. 87 The court of chancery held that the
directors were protected by the business judgment rule with regard to
adoption of the rights plan and the self tender. Furthermore, neither the
lock up nor the no shop provision were illegal per se.88 This portion of
the opinion rejects the view that directors confronted by a takeover bid
should simply auction off the company. 89
Once the business situation changed from preserving the corpora-
tion to an auction, however, Revlon held that the duty of the directors
was to obtain the best price for the shareholders. The directors breached
their duty of loyalty by making concessions to the white knight out of
concern for their liability to the noteholders, rather than maximizing the
sale of the company for the shareholders' benefit.90
This case leaves open the question of how vigorously the directors
can defend against a hostile takeover for the purpose of keeping a corpo-
ration in existence as an independent entity. Courts have given directors
wide latitude to defend the independence of the corporation if justified as
necessary for long-term shareholder interests. 91
In GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 92 the court allowed directors
to defend against an unwanted hostile takeover by making a defensive
exchange offer and selling off assets. In so doing, the court noted that the
directors could take employee interests into account and concluded that
the exercise of independent honest business judgment by directors is the
way to deal fairly with "both the protection of investors on the one hand,
and the legitimate concerns and interests of employees and management
86. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
87. Id. at 179.
88. Id.
89. Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of A Target's Management in Responding to
a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1194-95 (1981).
90. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 185.
91. See Sussman & Sussman, Takeover Cases Eye Non-Stockholder Interest, Legal Times,
Apr. 28, 1986, at 24. Recent cases on directors' responses to hostile offers are summarized in
Brownstein, Takeovers and the Business Judgment Rule, 20 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG.
177 (1987).
92. 624 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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of a corporation who service the interests of investors, on the other. '93
C. New State Laws
In reaction to the perception that hostile takeovers result in the loss
of employment, some state legislatures have been persuaded to change
the nature of a director's duty, substituting the concept of duty to various
constituencies for the traditional duty to shareholders. 94 Pennsylvania,
the first state to effect this change, has a statute that provides that in
discharging their duties, directors may, "in considering the best interests
of the corporation, consider the effects of any action upon employees,
upon suppliers and customers of the corporation and upon communities
in which offices or other establishments of the corporation are located,
and all other pertinent factors."9 5
A number of states have followed the Pennsylvania model, some
with variations on this theme of balancing constituencies. A Missouri
statute, which is specifically addressed to acquisition proposals, allows
directors to consider the social and economic efforts of the acquisition on
emplbyees, suppliers, customers, and communities. In addition, direc-
tors may consider the current value of the corporation if orderly liqui-
dated and the future value of the corporation over a period of years as an
independent entity.96 Similarly, a recent Ohio statute provides that in
determining the best interests of the corporation, a director can consider
the "long-term as well as short-term interests of the corporation and its
shareholders, including the possibility that these interests may be best
served by the continuing independence of the corporation. '97
Although differently phrased, these statutes are a product of polit-
ical dissatisfaction with the traditional judicial principle that directors
faced with a takeover owe their primary allegiance to shareholders.
Rather, these statutes posit a duty to other constituencies and a concern
for the survival of the corporate entity.
93. Id. at 1020. Similarly, in Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972), the
court upheld the Denver Post's defensive tactics to a hostile bid, noting the interests of readers
and employees of the paper.
94. One commentator has pointed out that the Midwestern and New England states
faced with the demise of manufacturing and high unemployment are more receptive to the
coalitions which lobby for such laws. Coffee, The Future of Corporate Federalism: State Com-
petition and the New Trend Toward De Facto Federal Minimum Standards, 8 CARDOZO L.
REV. 759, 770 (1987).
95. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8363 (Purdon Supp. 1987).
96. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.347 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
97. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59 (Anderson Supp. 1987). Similar statutes have
been passed in other states. See, eg., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (Supp. 1986);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251 (West 1987).
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D. Duty to the Enterprise
The notion that directors, in a change of control situation, owe a
duty to the corporation as well as stockholders is suggested by the opin-
ions in some cases involving target resistance to a hostile takeover. For
example, in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,98 the court noted that
"the board's power to act derives from its fundamental duty and obliga-
tion to protect the corporate enterprise, which includes stockholders,
from harm reasonably perceived, irrespective of its source." 99 Neverthe-
less, the court pointed out that when a board addresses a takeover bid,
there is an "omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in
its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its
shareholders."' 0 0
In Revlon' 0' and Union Carbide, 102 the courts likewise recognized
the legitimacy of a duty to the corporation that is larger than sharehold-
ers. These and other cases 10 3 suggest that directors may take into consid-
eration the interests of non-shareholder constituencies, particularly
employees, in fighting for the survival of a corporation as an independent
entity. The decisions recognize that the self-interest of directors in wish-
ing to remain in office can taint their decision-making. 1°4
The too-easy identification of management interests with employee
interests makes the balancing of constituencies by directors difficult and
frequently suspect. New state statutes permitting directors to take non-
shareholder interests into account may tilt the balance against hostile
takeovers, but otherwise they provide little guidance for how the conflicts
among corporate constituencies should be resolved, or what objectives
directors should pursue in effecting such a resolution. Applicable court
cases also are not helpful in identifying any new duty to replace the tradi-
98. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
99. Id. at 954.
100. Id.
101. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 180-81 (Del. 1986)
(directors can legally resist a hostile takeover if they have reasonable grounds for believing
there is a danger to corporate policy, effectiveness, or the corporate enterprise as a whole).
102. GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016, 1019-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(court recognized directors' duty to consider employees and management as well as investors).
103. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293-97 (7th Cir. 1981) (direc-
tors' resistance to merger offers was not a breach of fiduciary duty to shareholders even though
directors considered such factors as the desire to build value in the company itself and the
belief that such value might be diminished by a given offer); Moran v. Household Int'l, 500
A.2d 1346, 1354-57 (Del. 1985) (implementation of a rights plan, a defensive takeover mea-
sure, by corporate directors was not a breach of fiduciary duty to shareholders, although direc-
tors considered the vulnerability of the corporate entity to bust-up and two-tiered takeovers).
104. Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 265 (2d Cir. 1984).
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tional duty to shareholders that often has been honored in the breach in
allowing directors some latitude in dealing with unwanted bids.
The purpose of this Article has been to inquire whether the concept
of duty to the corporation owed by attorneys would be a useful model for
directors. To the extent that the Model Rules articulate a principle of
neutrality when an attorney is caught in a conflict between different cor-
porate constituencies, the attorney model could be helpful to directors
who believe that shareholder interests should not be paramount in a con-
tested takeover. This would be a particularly apt model if the result of
the takeover is liquidation of the corporate entity since attorneys are per-
mitted to counsel corporate survival.
Yet the analogy between attorneys and directors cannot be stretched
too far. Attorneys are agents of the corporation and directors are princi-
pals. Therefore the permission given to attorneys in the Model Rules to
presume that management is acting in the best interests of the corpora-
tion raises some troubling questions as a model for directors. Similarly,
while attorneys may consult a higher authority than management-the
board-in certain situations, the board itself must always exercise its own
judgment. Furthermore, the board does not owe the corporation the
duty of confidentiality that influences an attorney's conduct.
Nevertheless, the central principle of the attorney's duty to the cor-
poration-that counsel should act as an independent, neutral advisor-
could add a helpful gloss on the duty of a director if it served to express a
duty to the business enterprise. Various corporate constituencies stand
to lose or gain in any takeover. Critics who charge that the long-term
interests of the corporation are sacrificed in a takeover really mean that
the long-term value of the assets under management are eroded instead
of enhanced by a contest for control. Directors should be permitted to
decide in what hands the assets of the corporation will be best managed
for the benefit of all concerned constituencies. Unfortunately, most cases
focus on tactics, power, and conflicts of interest, rather than an appraisal
of the best interests of the business enterprise as a going concern.
A judgment about the long-term value of a business enterprise may
be more appropriate to an appraisal proceeding than a typical takeover
case. Nevertheless, if courts began viewing the director's duty to the cor-
poration as a positive obligation to the business enterprise rather than as
a check upon or justification for defensive tactics, a model of directors'
duty could evolve that would be more appropriate for contests for corpo-
rate control than current models have proven.
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Conclusion
Contests for corporate control are severely testing long-established
principles of corporate law. In this process, the duty owed by a director
to stockholders is being re-examined. State legislatures and some courts
have expressed dissatisfaction with traditional theories by positing a duty
to constituencies in addition to or different from a duty to shareholders
and have supported defensive tactics designed to assure corporate
survival.
This Article inquires whether an attorney's duty to the corporate
entity is a possible paradigm for a target corporation's directors' duty to
the corporation. Despite the significant differences in the role of direc-
tors and attorneys, the concept of a duty to the corporate entity, as dis-
tinct from separate and conflicting corporate constituencies, could prove
useful. If, however, the SEC were to succeed in undermining the entity
theory of an attorney's duty to the corporation and establish a corporate
duty owed directly to investors, the duty of corporate counsel would add
nothing to existing models for the duty of corporate directors assessing a
takeover bid.
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